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The issue concerning the exact relation between 
the mind and the body can be traced back at least as 
far as Plato. Traditionally, there have been two 
salient questions raised. What sort of thing is the 
mind? Are our minds the same as our bodies (or brains), 
or are.they different in nature? Contemporary philoso-
phers have tended to recast the second question in 
the following terms: Are mental expressions wholly 
translatable into a neurophysiological or dispositional 
vocabulary? Formerly, to maintain that the mind and 
the body are somehow one and the same was to advocate 
"the identity theory." Today the advocates of the 
identity theory maintain that (in some sense) mental 
expressions are wholly translatable into neurophysio-
logical or dispositional terms. The most recent 
defenders of the identity theory have argued in 
particular that the suitable translation concerns not 
the meaning of mental expressions, but simply their 
factual reference. Richard Rorty is a modern rep-
resentative of this point of view, 
According to the "disappearance view," as he 
calls it, what we ordinarily refer to by "sensations" 
are nothing but brain processes, and that as a result 
of continued empirical progress—either "some day, 
'sensation,' 'pain,' 'mental image,' and the like will 
drop out of our vocabulary,"1 or "at no greater cost 
than inconvenient linguistic reform, we could drop 
such terms" (pp. IH-'lS). Rorty thinks a disappearance 
view which embraces the former is "almost certainly 
wrong" (p. U4). A view of the latter sort he believes 
to be "entirely justified" (p. MS). 
On either view, it is maintained that statements 
like "Demons are nothing but hallucinations" and 
"Sensations are nothing but brain processes" are on an 
equal footing, both in terms of being true and in 
terms of the grounds we have for accepting them as true. 
With regard to the latter, both claims are such that 
scientific evidence may give us sufficient reason for 
believing them and, hence, for supposing that (at 
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least, in principle) we could replace demon-talk with 
hallucination-talk and sensation-talk with brain 
process-talk. Beyond this, however, the two disappear-
ance views part ways. The first view maintains that 
this program will be carried out in practice, while 
the second view maintains, to the contrary, that such 
a verbal revolution would be too "monstrously incon-
venient" (Rorty, p. 41) to be realized. 
Rorty is inclined to think that there is only one 
significant obstacle facing those who would advocate 
the second form of the disappearance view: Since our 
knowledge of our sensations involves a certain sort 
of (privileged) privacy, it could never be that we 
had reason enough, on empirical grounds, for believing 
that sensations are identical with brain processes. 
Rorty believes that if this objection to the identity 
theory can be overcome, then the plausibility' of the 
second version of the identity theory is not very hard 
to show. Thus,, he says, " . . . I am inclined to say 
that if the problem about 'privacy' is overcome, then 
the Identity Theorist lias made out his case" (Rorty, 
p. 49). 
I wish to examine Rorty's argument against the 
"privacy problem" and argue that he has not attacked 
it soundly. Consequently, if Rorty is right (and I 
think he is) that this difficulty is a serious 
obstacle to the plausibility of the identity theory, 
it would appear that the identity theory is flawed 
in a critical respect. 
Before examining Rorty's critique in detail, some 
preliminary remarks are in order. First, he restricts 
himself to a consideration of the identity of brain 
processes with sensations for two (quite legitimate) 
reasons: (1) because a consideration of a full blown 
mind-body identity theory would require far more 
complexity and time than are necessary for his purposes, 
(2) because the issue of the identity of sensations 
with brain processes seems to be the form of the mind-
body dispute most discussed in the recent literature. 
Second, though Rorty formulates the identity theory in 
terms of brain processes,2 I would prefer to character-
ize this theory in terms of the relation between 
sensations and physiological states or events (here-
after using "states" somewhat technically to cover 
both occurrences and static features). I have one 
major reason for preferring this way of characterizing 
the identity theory. By stating it in this more 
liberal fashion, we allow the identity theorist more 
ground to make good his essential view and, thus, 
make more interesting both the identity theory and 
any objection to the theory. 
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According to the privacy objection to the identity 
theory, each of us bears a special relationship to, 
at least, some of our mental states, e.g., pain, and 
this fact is inexplicable on the view that mental states 
are nothing but physiological states. The general idea 
here is the following. We are related to some of our 
sensations in such a way that necessarily if we believe 
that we are having sensation S, then we are having 
sensation S (or necessarily if we are having sensation 
S, then we realize that we are having sensation S ) . 
That is, this relationship between what sensations we 
believe we have and our sensations sometimes constitutes 
incorrigible knowledge (or, on the other hand, what we 
might call " first person omniscience"). For example, 
our sincere report that we are in pain constitutes the 
best possible evidence that we (or anyone else) can 
have that we are in pain. But if the identity theory 
were correct, this sould not be the case. If all our 
sensations are nothing but physiological states, then 
it should be possible in principle for someone else, 
say, a scientist to identify those physiological states 
which are our sensations and to determine by direct 
observation when we are having sensation S, S_i, S3 > 
etc. In other words, if the identity theory were 
correct, then our sensations would all be essentially 
public, and our sincere report that we are in pain 
would not necessarily be the best evidence that we are 
in pain. Rorty cites Kurt Baier as an advocate of 
the privacy view.3 
Rorty criticizes this sort of objection by con-, 
sidering a slightly different sort of case. We are 
to consider a time when . . . 
suitable similarities are in fact found to 
occur—the same similarities in all subjects--
until one day (long after all empirical 
generalizations about sensations qua sensations 
have been subsumed under physiological laws, 
and long after direct manipulation of the brain 
has become the exclusive method of relieving 
pain) somebody (call him Jones) thinks he has 
no pain, but the encephalograph says that the 
brain process correlated with pain did occur. 
(Let us imagine that Jones himself is observing 
the gadget and that the problem about whether 
he might have made a mistake is a problem for 
Jones-, this eliminates the possibility of 
lying.) (Rorty, p. SI) 
What Rorty argues is that instead of concluding here 
that the encephalograph misleadingly indicates that 
he is in pain, it is more likely that Jones (or others) 
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would first conclude that he did " . . . not know what 
pain is--i.e., that he is not using the word 'pain' in 
the way in which his fellows use it" (Rorty, p. 51). 
The problem then raised for the privacy objection is 
that we must be able to distinguish the case where a 
person infallibly reports that he has a certain sensa-
tion S from the case where a person incorrectly (or 
correctly) utters a report R, but does not use his 
words as others do. 
We now see that the claim that "such a mistake 
is inconceivable" is an ellipsis for the claim 
that a mistake, made by one who knows what 
pain is, is inconceivable, for only this expanded 
form wTll entail that when Jones and the 
encephalograph disagree, Jones is always right. 
But when formulated in this way, our infalli-
bility about our pains can be seen to be empty. 
Being infallible about something would be 
useful only if we could draw the usual dis-
tinction between misnaming and misjudging, and, 
having ascertained that we were not misnaming, 
know that we were not misjudging. But where 
there are no criteria for misjudging (or to 
put it more accurately, where in crucial cases 
the criteria for misjudging turn out to be the 
same as the criteria for misnaming), then to 
say that we are infallible is to pay ourselves 
an empty compliment. (Rorty, pp. 53-51) 
I think we can consider the following to be a 
central argument in Rorty*s critique of the privacy 
objection: 
A. In order for anyone to know that a person 
P g^ives an infallible introspective report 
that P is in pain, we must be able to dis-
tinguFsh between P not meaning by "pain" 
what we mean by "pain" and P using "pain" 
as we do, but mistakenly judging that P 
is in pain. 
B. We are unable to distinguish the above two 
kinds of cases (". . . the familiar 
difficulty about the vocabulary used in 
making introspective reports. . ." (Rorty, 
pp. 51-52). 
Therefore: 
C. Wo one can know that a person P gives in-
fallible introspective reports that P is 
in pain. 
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The reason for the necessary condition proviso em-
bodied in A. is that otherwise it will always be 
possible that the evidence we have that people make 
such infallible reports is merely indicative that they 
do not know how to use "pain" (or, at least, that 
they do not use "pain" as we do). Naturally, this 
case of a person reporting that he is in pain simply 
illustrates Rorty's more general point. This more 
general point could be formulated in a broader, more 
complex argument in which one would speak of any 
sensation which a person might be supposed infallibly 
to report. 
The thrust of Rorty's argument against the privacy 
objection is that it is, at best i n c o n c l u s i v e . I 
shall argue that in so far a3 this argument is em-
bodied in argument A. £ B. tt- C., it is unsound. 
Naturally, my argument against Rorty's view will, if 
plausible, simultaneously tend to show that Rorty's 
attack on the privacy objection is, at least, in-
conclusive. I shall rest quite content if I can make 
plausible this latter thesis. 
Before directly examining A. 6 B. B- C. , I would 
like to consider Rorty's example of the case in which 
a person'hooked-up to an encephalograph reports that 
he is not in pain, yet the machine indicates that he 
is in pain. Rorty argues that such a person would 
first begin to suspect not that the encephalograph's 
readings were misleading, but that he was not using 
"pain" as it was conventionally used by his community. 
Although the essential soundness or unsoundness of 
Rorty's position does not depend on how we view this 
case, I would like to suggest that Rorty's perspective 
here is by no means obviously correct. Some people 
might first conclude what he says they would in these 
circumstances, but I think many reasonable people 
would draw a very different conclusion. We tend to 
be very covetous of our ability to know when we are 
in such mental states as pain or anxiety, and we would 
generally think it queer (if we did not simply resent 
it) for others to insist that we were in pain when we 
did not think we were.5 Rather than making the in-
ference Rorty suggests, I think it likely that the 
chap in his example would think that others did not 
know what they were talking about, that he was the 
victim of some silly or sinister joke, or that he 
had gone berserk. 
In order for this case of Rorty's to be at all 
plausible, I think we must imagine that in this norno-
logically advanced culture, the conventions for the 
use of "pain" are such that the following sort of 
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entailments obtain: 
E. Necessarily, if encephalograph readings 
indicate that a person P is in pain and 
there is no mechanical failure or human 
error in reading the encephalograph, then 
P is in pain. 
Ej. Necessarily, if a person P exhibits certain 
physiological states, then P is in pain. 
In other words, we need to suppose that in this 
linguistic community, there are certain public criteria 
which are sufficient to make true a sentence like "Elmo 
is in pain." We need to imagine that, in this community 
the concept of pain is wholly public in nature. But 
it is very difficult to imagine such a society, and in 
order to do so, I think we must suppose that they do 
not understand what we understand by "pain." Certain-
ly, E. and E^. are not entailments which we currently 
subscribe to (nor ones which have been normally advo-
cated in human history). While pain is for us not 
essentially private in the epistemic sense that no one 
other than ourselves can ever know when we are (or are 
not) in pain, neither are the criteria for being in 
pain entirely public in nature. Perhaps the best 
evidence of this is that one may correctly use "pain" 
in "I am in pain" where one bases this on nothing 
derived from one's five senses. Thus, one begins to 
feel a toothache and is prepared to report (if 
appropriate) that one is in pain, even though one has 
not been to a dentist and has not observed the cavity 
in one's throbbing tooth. 
Let me now turn to Rorty's argument, A. £ B.H- C. 
I wish to concede premise A. If we have no reasonable 
basis for distinguishing misnaming from mis judging, it 
is hard to see how we could know that another person's 
introspective report is true. Indeed, if we cannot 
distinguish between misnaming and misjudging in general, 
it is hard to see how we could know that anyone's 
report—introspective or n o t — i s true. What about 
premise B.? Rorty argues that in the case of intro-
spective reports, we are unable to tell whether the 
other (i) is using his vocabulary as we do and is 
reporting accurately, or (ii) is using his vocabulary 
differently than we do. He thinks that this is a 
special difficulty with introspective vocabulary. But 
is this true? I think not. 
Is there some special problem of distinguishing 
between misnaming and misjudging in the case of intro-
spective reports? How we answer this depends in large 
part on how demanding (or how sceptical) we are willing 
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to be. Consider the following as a possible criterion 
for discerning in a particular instance whether 
another person mTsnames rather than misjudges when 
he gives an introspective report: 
C* It is logically inconceivable that he uses 
his sensation-words differently than I (we). 
Clearly, this criterion will not do. We will always be 
able to imagine in a particular case that others use 
their sensation-words in a manner different from our 
own (e.g., that in this case, the other is being pur-
posely misleading). However, it should also be clear 
that this criterion, if appropriately generalized, 
would present an equally difficult problem for non-
introspective reports. When others say in particular 
circumstances that the sky is very blue today, the 
hammer is on the table, the leaves are turning yellow, 
etc., it will always be conceivable that they are 
using their observation terms in a deviant fashion. 
Consequently, if we want to be able to tell whether 
others are using their words—introspective or n o t — 
as we do, C f t is a criterion which will not allow us to 
do so. 
Granting that it is not by use of C* that Rorty 
finds a special problem for introspective reports, 
wherein lies this special difficulty? The answer to 
this seems, for Rorty, to lie in how we are able to 
verify that another's introspective reports are 
accurate. Apparently, the rub is that unless we have 
public criteria for the proper use of introspective 
vocabulary, we have no way of telling—especially in 
the case of allegedly infallible introspective reports — 
whether others are misnaming ormisjudging. At least, 
we have no independent means of verifying whether the 
other uses his sensation-words as we do and makes a 
true report, or whether he simply uses his words 
differently than we do. 
If this is Rorty's suggestion, then I think he 
is mistaken. After all, we can use public criteria 
to test whether or not the person is sincere in his 
introspective report that he is in pain. Thus, for 
example, we can use the usual public criteria for 
ascertaining whether the person is generally honest 
and sane, as well as the public criteria which in-
dicate whether he has any reason to deceive us about 
the case at hand. Does he keep his promises, and 
does he report matters that are confirmed by others 
who are in a position to know? Does he behave bizarre-
ly, and does he have a record of mental illness? Is 
he given to jest, and does he have any reason to jest 
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in these circumstances? All of these questions can be 
answered by appeal to public criteria, criteria which 
would give us a reasonable basis for discerning the 
other fellow's sincerity in a particular case. 
By "reasonable criteria" I do not mean that such 
public criteria are infallible indicators of a person's 
sincerity. They are not. Still, a criterion may 
serve as an independent means of verification without 
being an infallible criterion. A scale serves as a 
reasonable and independent means of ascertaining a 
person's weight, even though we realize that a scale 
can be defective and unreliable in a particular case. 
Let me trace this general point through a proble-
matic sort of case. Suppose a young girl reports to 
her mother that she has a headache and does not feel 
well enough to attend school. Suppose, furthermore, 
that the girl has occasionally lied about such things 
in the past. What public and independent criteria 
can her mother use to assess her daughter's sincerity? 
I think the following questions include many of the 
criteria which are relevant here. Has the girl shown 
a desire to avoid some event scheduled at school that 
day, or has she shown interest in seeing some TV show 
that day? Does she occasionally or persistently 
wince, groan, or cry out? Does she behave lethargically? 
Is she prepared to eat or drink her usual favorites? 
Does she stand up under her mother's "cross examina-
tion?" If the answers to these questions (in order) 
are no, yes, yes, no, yes—we have probably and in-
dependent confirmation of the girl's sincerity. If 
the answers (in order) are yes, no , no, yes, n o — w e 
have probably and independent disconfirmation of the 
girl's sincerity. 
But suppose the mother discovers a mixed answer 
to these questions and, in order to be on the safe 
side, takes her daughter to the family doctor. 
Suppose the girl persists in her avowal of pain, 
groans occasionally, yet the doctor's examination 
reveals no physical basis for her discomfort. Does 
the mother nave conclusive disconfirmation that her 
daughter is sincere or that she is in pain? No. Does 
the mother have probable disconfirmation? I would 
say no. Even if we restrict ourselves to the tech-
nical results of the medical examination (which we 
should not), there is the genuine possibility that 
more extensive medical tests are required. At this 
point, the mother may be perplexed, but not necessarily 
overly suspicious that her daughter is insincere in 
her report of pain. 
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Suppose that the girl persists in avowing her pain 
acting lethargic, occasionally groaning, and is sub-
jected, to further intensive medical examination. At 
this point, other criteria of her sincerity come into 
play, e.g., her inability to play with her friends, her 
inability to eat her normal delights. Finally, 
suppose that after the most extensive and intensive 
testing known to medicine, she persists in her headache 
avowal, yet the tests uncover no physical basis for her 
discomfort. What do the public criteria now indicate 
with regard to her sincerity or her state of pain? Do 
the medical tests show, by themselves, that she is in-
sincere or that she is not in pain? I think we could 
not easily maintain this. Again, the physical basis 
for the pain might simply be undetectable by present 
medical techniques. Overall, I think a conscientious 
person would be perplexed, but certainly allow that the 
girl was probably sincere in her pain reports. After 
all, she is sacrificing a great deal of what is 
important to little girls if we suppose that she is 
faking her condition. On the other side of the coin, 
would we have conclusive and public proof that she was 
sincere and in pain? I think not. It would still be 
conceivable that the whole affair was a grand hoax 
(perhaps to get attention) or even that these were the 
first symptoms of the little girl's mental breakdown. 
In any case, I think the above indicates, first, that 
there are public criteria for assessing the sincerity 
of a person's mental-reports and, second, what is 
the nature of such criteria--i.e., a complex set of 
criteria which serve as bases for probabilistic con-
firmations or disconfirmations of a person's sincerity. 
We may also use public criteria to determine 
whether the other person uses "pain as we would. 
For example, if he sees another person being burned, 
is he inclined to judge that the other is in pain? 
Similarly, if he sees someone bump her leg on the 
sharp corner of a piece of furniture, is he inclined 
to affirm that she is in pain? Thus, we may have good 
evidence that the other uses "pain" as we do. Finally, 
we have another independent means at our disposal for 
determining that the other uses "pain" as we do, i.e., 
our own first person experience of ourselves. We 
know on this basis whether we are prepared to judge 
that we are (or are not) in pain when our only evidence 
is what we feel (or do not feel). Similarly, we know 
whether we would be prepared to allow that such judg-
ments as ours can be mistaken. For these reasons I 
think Rorty is simply mistaken in suggesting that we 
have no independent means of verifying whether or not 
a person makes a truly infallible introspective report-
that he is (or is not) in pain--as opposed to his 
simply using "pain" differently than we do. It thus 
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appears that premise B. is false and that Rorty's argu-
ment against the privacy objection is defective. 
If what I have argued up to this point is correct, 
if Rorty has overlooked these rather obvious counter-
examples to premise B., how am I to account for the 
fact that Rorty is clearly convinced that we have no 
basis for drawing the distinction between misnaming and 
misjudging in the case of introspective reports? In 
order to understand this , let us take a look at the 
sort of case R*orty uses to illustrate his point. 
To see that there is no genuine contrast 
in this, case, suppose that Jones was not 
burned prior to the time he hitches on 
the encephalograph, but now he is. When 
he is, the encephalograph says that the 
brain-process constantly correlated with 
pain reports occurs in Jones' brain. How-
ever, although he exhibits pain-behavior, 
Jones thinks that he does not feel pain. 
(But now as in the past, he both ex-
hibits pain-behavior and thinks he feels 
pain when he is frozen, stuck struck, 
racked, etc.) Now is it that he does 
not know that pain covers what you feel 
when you are stuck, struck, etc.? Or is 
it that he really does not feel pain when 
he is burned? (Rorty, p. 52) 
We are to imagine a case where a person exhibits all 
the criteria for our correctly saying that he is in 
pain except one, i.e., he does not think that he is in 
pain. Here the indeterminacy question is supposed to 
arise. 
I think we must grant that whenever a person uses 
an expression in a very unexpected way, we are left up 
in the air as to whether he knows how that expression 
is normally used. Still, considered solely in this 
light, the sceptical question raised here is no peculiar 
problem for introspective reports. The same point would 
hold for any report whatsoever.6 Consequently, this 
alone cannot be the reason that Rorty thinks we have 
peculiar problems in distinguishing misnaming from mis-
judging in the case of introspective reports. Let us 
again turn to Rorty's own remarks to help clarify this. 
The dilemma is that either a report about 
one's sensations which violates a certain 
public criterion is a sufficient condition 
for saying that the reporter does not know 
how to use 'pain' in the correct way, or 
there is no such criterion. If there is, 
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the fact that one cannot be mistaken about 
pains does not entail that sincere reports 
cannot be over-ridden. If there is not, 
then there is no way . . . to eliminate 
the possibility that Jones may not know 
what pain is. (Rorty, p. 5 3) 
I think we are now in a better position to under-
stand why Rorty believes there is this special problem 
with introspective reports. It is not a problem with 
them per se, but only when we suppose that there is no 
public criterion for determining whether they are cor-
rect or incorrect. When we make this supposition, 
Rorty argues that we have no way of discerning whether 
the reporter is using his words as we do and is correct, 
or is not using his words as we do. The crux of Rorty's 
position can now, I think, be precisely formulated, and 
we should be able to see why it is misdirected. 
Rorty urges that if we suppose there is no public 
criterion which constitutes a "sufficient condition for 
saying that the reporter does not know how to use 
'pain,'" then we have no way of telling whether a person 
who says (sincerely) "I am not in pain" is using his 
words differently than we would. If, on the other hand, 
there is such a sufficient condition, then "the fact 
that one cannot be mistaken about pains does not entail 
that sincere reports cannot be over-ridden." Let us 
consider the first horn of this alleged dilemma. It 
seems to me, so long as we are careful to interpret 
"sufficient condition for saying . . . " appropriately, 
what Rorty urges here is correct. Consider a person 
who sincerely said "Bing burned, stuck, struck, etc. 
is seldom a good indication that a person is in pain." 
Similarly consider a person who sincerely said things 
like "Pain is not a sensation," "Pain is greater than 
4," "That oak tree has my pain," "That rock is in pain." 
Such utterances would provide us very good evidence 
that the person did not use "pain" as we normally do. 
They would be very like the case given by Rorty of a 
person who sincerely says that blue is not a color. 
The problem here is that Rorty thinks that the latter 
case is genuinely analogous to the case where a person 
denies that he is in pain when public criteria like 
encephalograph reading indicate that the person is in 
pain. Rorty does not argue for the plausibility of 
this analogy, but takes it for granted that the compari-
son will be intuitive to the reader. This comparison is 
not intuitive to me, and I would argue that the clear-
cut public criteria we have for saying that another 
does not know how to use "pain" (like those I mention 
above) are not particularly supportive of the identity 
theory. 
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Let us now consider the second horn of this alleged 
dilemma. I want to focus on the notion of a public 
criterion which is a "sufficient condition for saying 
that the reporter does not know how to use 'pain' in the 
correct way." First, as I have already argued, such a 
"sufficient" condition may well take the form of a 
probabilistic criterion. Even in cases where a person 
uses words in what seems a clearly bizarre way, there 
are factors, e.g., the person's sincerity, which miti-
gate against our holding that the person does not, 
beyond the shadow of any reasonable doubt, know how to 
use those words. Second, this sort of sufficient condi-
tion may be interpreted in such a way that we can 
reasonably over-ride another's sincere report that he 
is in pain, yet this would not show that the person can 
be mistaken about such reports. Our criteria for saying 
that another person is in such-and-such a mental state 
-ire not simply criteria for making it true that the 
person is in that mental state. Many of our criteria 
for saying that such-and-such is the case (and I think 
this is true in the case of many mental phenomena) are 
;simply criteria for it being meaningful or reasonable 
to judge that such-and-such is the case. In short, 
knowing how to apply a word is not always the same as 
knowing the possible circumstances in which that word 
is, as a matter of fact, true of something. Thus, I 
may say, "liiere is a storm coming on," based upon the 
clouds I see on the horizon. I am hardly to be convicted 
of not knowing how to use "storm" simply because no storm 
occurs. Black clouds on the appropriate horizon, thunder 
in the distance, rapid changes in temperature, and so on, 
are perfectly good, albeit inconclusive, cues for my say-
ing that there will be a storm in my immediate area. 
Similarly, a person who hallucinates that there are rats 
in his bed and says, "Get these rats out of my bed!" does 
not show that he does not know how to use "rat." Even 
though there are no rats in Iiis bed, his vivid experience 
makes it reasonable for him to say what he does. 
Assuming that our linguistic conventions for the 
correct use of terms are not always conventions for a 
term's being true of the thing in question, let us 
return to the second horn of this alleged dilemma. 
Given human interests and needs, there are various 
factors to be weighed in cases where another person 
reports that he is in pain. To simplify what is a very 
complex context here, let me simply note the following 
factors. On the one hand, there is the question of how 
likely it is that the other is really in pain. Here 
both present and past public evidence needs to be con-
sidered. On the other hand, there is the question--no 
matter how likely it is that he is not in pain—of the 
relative effects upon him, as against those on others, 
whether he is in pain or we act as if he were. Suppose 
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he is in severe pain, but that we do not believe him and 
act as if he is not. Normally, this would mean that we 
are treating him inhumanely. But, suppose that he is 
not in severe pain and that by acting as if he were in 
pain, we would have to neglect several people who both 
reported that they were in severe pain and were supported 
by all our public evidence. In such a case, we may well 
imagine that the public evidence (that the one fellow is 
not in pain) would over-ride his sincere reports that he 
is in pain. Viewed in this light, the reader should be 
able to imagine other sorts of cases where public evi-
dence would over-ride a person's sincere reports that 
he was in pain, yet this does not imply that the person 
was not in pain. 
The moral to this discussion is simple. Neither 
alternative of Rorty's alleged dilemma represents a 
problem for the privacy objection. In the senses of 
"public criteria which constitute a sufficient condi-
tion . . . " which I have specified, the advocate of the 
privacy objection can grant that there are (and need to 
be) such public criteria, yet deny that this sheds doubt 
on our knowing infallibily that we are in pain. We can 
do this if we grant that our concept of pain is not 
wholly public in nature and if we grant the plausibility 
of the following sorts of assumptions: 
1. Our public criteria for discerning whether 
. another is in pain are reliable, albeit 
probabilistic, criteria. 
2. Our criteria for correctly using a term 
are not always criteria for that term's 
being true of the thing to which it is 
applied (but are frequently criteria for 
it being reasonable to say that the term 
applies to the thing in question). 
3. A person's reporting that he is not in 
pain when all other public evidence 
indicate that he is in pain is not 
like a person's saying that blue is not 
a color. 
4. That we have criteria which can allow 
us to over-ride a person's sincere 
report that he is (or is not) in pain 
does not imply that the person's pain-
report is fallible. 
Rorty's line of argument ignores such assumptions 
and seems to belie a sort of neo-verificationism. His 
argument would appear to presuppose that unless there 
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are, in crucial cases, clear-cut/definitive criteria for 
empirically determining the truth or falsity of a 
sentence, that sentence cannot assert a synthetic propo-
sition. ? Needless, to say, I do not think that such 
verificationism is tenable, but this is not the place 
to treat that issue in the depth which it deserves. I 
rest content if I have shown that the grounds for Rorty's 
attack upon the privacy objection a r e — i f not clearly 
unsound—at least controversial in nature. 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
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NOTES 
Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and 
Categories," Philosophy of Hind, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Harper £ Row! New York, N.Y. , 1966), p. **»». 
2 
Thus he says, " . . . the Identity Theory (by 
which I mean . . . that empirical inquiry will dis-
cover that sensations (not thoughts) are identical 
with certain brain-processes) . . . " Ibid, pp. 30-31. 
3 
"However good the evidence may be, such a physi-
ological theory can never be used to show to the suf-
ferer that he was mistaken in thinking he had a pain, 
for such a mistake is inconceivable" (Baier, as quoted 
by Rorty, p. 50). 
I say "at best" since given that Rorty appeals to 
Wittgensteinian points about the proper use of language 
— e . g . , " . . . that sensation-reports must conform to 
public criteria or else be disallowed . . ."—he may 
well be arguing something stronger. He may be arguing 
that the privacy objection is misguided in principle, 
since it presupposes that there are non-public criteria 
for the sensible use of sensation-words—a presupposition 
which is essentially confused. 
^My remark here might strike the reader as more of 
a psychological or sociological comment than one which 
is normatively relevant to Rorty's main argument. Never-
theless, Rorty's case of the "future" fellow hooked up 
to an encephalograph is also couched in (predictively) 
descriptive rather then normative terms. I am simply 
responding in kind by questioning the correctness of 
his factual claim. The more normative aspects of 
Rorty's argument are taken up later in this paper. 
Rorty seems to realize this when he gives the case 
of a person who uses 'blue' in all the usual ways, save 
that he refuses to grant that blue is a color. 
7 
For confirmation of my view that Rorty presupposes 
a kind of verificationism, as well as for an interesting 
analysis of Rorty's over-all philosophical perspective, 
see Douglas Ehring's article "Transcendental Arguments: 
Verificationism or Parasitism?," Aus legung, Vol. IV, 
No. 1 (Nov. 1976). 
